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ABSTRACT 
The bulk of the South African cotton crop is produced by large scale commercial farmers. Therefore it 
might be misleading to present South Africa’s impressive Genetically Modified Cotton (GMC) 
adoption figures as evidence of successful GMC use by smallholder farmers.  The South African 
cotton sector struggles in an unstable production and market environment and smallholders with 
limited resources and limited production, managerial and marketing capacity and choice suffer most. 
The total South African cotton area and number of farmers decreased drastically since the introduction 
of GMC and this causes observers to question the so-called success story of GMC in South Africa. 
The South African smallholder experience has shown that technology introduction on its own cannot 
sustainably increase production; factors like institutional arrangements plays a vital role. Studies have 
in the past focussed exclusively on the performance of the new technology and the institutional role 
has been under emphasised. The results of our research complement the existing studies by pointing 
out low profitability in an unfavourable climatic and institutional context. This reminds us that rain-
fed agriculture remains sensitive to climatic hazards and that new technology adoption under these 
conditions might increase financial risk associated with cotton production.  
 




A number of studies have assessed the effectiveness and profitability of the use of Genetically 
Modified Varieties (GMV) in agriculture (Edens, et al., 1998; Marra, et al., 2003; McBride 
and Books, 2000).  Genetically Modified Cotton (GMC) has received most attention to date, 
in particular insect-resistant varieties utilising a Bt gene (Bt-cotton). The relevance of using 
GMVs in developing countries  nevertheless remains a matter of controversy. Even though 
most research studies in DC have shown a range of benefits accruing to smallholders some 
opponents ague that these varieties do not fit the real needs of smallholders in DCs (Mazoyer, 
2000; Myers, 1999), others still question their effectiveness and profitability (de Grassi, 2003) 
owing to the high seed cost and even more so  when seeds are supplied through a 
monopolistic market scheme (Pschorn-Strauss, 2004). After about ten years of dissemination 
of Bt-cotton, positive global impacts are still emphasized (Brookes and Barfoot, 2006; 
Gomez-Barbero and Rodriguez-Cerezo, 2006), but recently more balanced views also caution 
against shortfalls of the economic analysis implemented (Fok, 2006; Smale, et al., 2006) and 
focus more on the variation of the impacts according to local agronomic and institutional 
conditions (Fok, 2006; Smale, et al., 2006) or in advocating for organisational and 
institutional adjustments so as to ensure fair and profitable conditions to producers in DCs 
(Fok, 2006). 
Developing countries, notably in Africa, are keen on using GMC. South Africa has been 
planting  Bt-cotton since the 1997/98 cotton production season. Burkina Faso has just decided 
to move forward dissemination after field experiment since 2002 (Baillard, 2006) but farmers 
in Mali have again demonstrated their opposition even for the conduct of field trials on Bt-
cotton (Samphier and Carlile, 2006). Outside Africa, cotton sector stakeholders in Pakistan 
are pushing for the authorisation of Bt-cotton so as not to further lag behind India. The 
observation of the positive experiences in DCs (China, South Africa, India) has contributed to 
convince international organizations to support the promotion of GMC in other DCs (Hoag, 
2003). 
The positive outcomes associated with Bt-cotton pertain to profitability gain (resulting from 
reduction of insecticide sprays and yield increase due to bollworm damage limitation) as well 
as to a net diminution in labour investment (for insecticide spraying, not considering greater 
labour requirement at harvest associated with higher yield)  However extrapolation of these 
results are tricky as local contexts seldom are taken into account, in particular with regard to 
the organisation of the input and output markets and institutional arrangements that govern 
them, a factor of critical importance in smallholding production. 
This paper endeavours to more comprehensively report on the South-African smallholder Bt-
cotton experience, and reports the findings of a survey conducted during the 2002/03 cotton 
production season. It will emphasize the variation in profitability, the significant change in the 
production cost and the resulting greater financial risk associated to using Bt-cotton. 
This paper is organized as follows. The first section sheds light on the characteristics of cotton 
production in South-Africa, while the second section provides a synthesis of previous impact 
assessment studies. The third section reports the outcomes of the survey focussing on the 
farming structure and the Bt-cotton economic results, achieved under quite unfavourable 
climatic and institutional conditions. 
PRODUCTION KEEPS ON DECLINING 
Minimal contribution of smallholders to cotton production 
In spite of the liberalisation of the cotton sector in late 1997 when the Cotton Board was 
disillusioned in terms of the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act (1996), (or arguably 
maybe because of liberalisation), cotton production South-Africa followed a downward trend reaching less than 20 000 tons of cotton lint, far from the historic record achieved in 1988 
(Figure 1). The area under cotton has seen a continuous decline since 1989 and in recent years 
a number of cotton gins have been forced to close due to inability to cover fixed costs. 
Liberalisation of the cotton sector (cf. infra) and abolishment of the marketing board were not 
able to sustainably re-launch cotton production. Cotton lint importations have historically 
exceeded national production and have done so even in recent years when the national textile 
industry is struggling under globalisation pressure. 
Due to South Africa’s political history, large-scale commercial farmers are generally white 
and smallholders black.  For many commercial farmers cotton is not the dominant or only 
farming enterprise and it is produced in combination with other crops. The choice of 
enterprise is usually determined by availability of irrigation water, the rotation requirements 
of the soil and the relative prices of the competing enterprises like maize and sugar cane under 
irrigation or maize and sunflower seed on dryland. For smallholders the possibility of 
producing other crops is limited due to climatic conditions and a lack of support services.  
Like almost all previous SA smallholder cotton studies our survey was conducted in the 
Makhathini Flats, situated in northern KwaZulu Natal close to the borders with Swaziland and 
Mozambique. The Makhathini Flats is one of only two areas in South Africa where 
smallholders have been producing cotton for the last couple of decades in a relatively 
sustainable manner.  The area receives an annual rainfall of about 550 mm, concentrated 
between September and May and due to this low rainfall and severely hot conditions in 
summer cotton is one of few crops that can be produced under dryland conditions on the 
Flats. Market liberalisation and an increased focus on smallholder farming after the change in 
the political regime has not had a sustainable positive effect on smallholder cotton production.  
In relative terms, the contribution of the smallholders to the national cotton production 
remains low and the percentage increase during the last couple of years is purely due to the 
decrease in production by commercial farmers (Figure 1 and Table 1).  
Since liberalisation of the cotton sector, the number of the cotton growers in the Makhathini 
Flats has fluctuated around 3000 until the 2002/03 production season when the number of 
farmers fell to less than 400. The dryland area also fell from over 12 000 hectares in 1997/98 
to around 5 000 hectares in 2001/02 to just over 1 400 hectares in 2002/03.  In 2005/06 the 
number of cotton farmers again increased and more than 6 000 hectares of dryland cotton 
were planted. Reasons for these fluctuations in area and farmer numbers are explained later in 
the paper. Up to the 2002/03 campaign, cotton lint yield has fluctuated around 200 kg/ha or 
540 kg/ha of seed cotton, or at best half of what was being observed in Francophone African 
countries. During the last couple of seasons, average yield has increased because of a higher 
share of irrigated production on the Makhathini Flats. 
Table 1. Smallholders' contribution to cotton production in South Africa 
 
Nat. Prod.
tons fibre total Kwazulu N. rainfed Irrigated total tons Nat. Share,  %  irrigated rainfed only
1996/97 45 000 3655 3000 11351 1671 13022 2925 6.5% 731 150
1997/98 31 000 3062 2200 12270 2226 14496 4094 13.2% 654 215
1998/99 42 000 3604 2200 7073 2360 9433 3345 8.0% 812 202
1999/00 53 000 3486 3000 7690 404 8094 809 1.5% 256 108
2000/01 30 000 3312 3000 4275 129 4404 1460 4.9% 977 331
2001/02 39 000 3688 3229 10828 88 10916 864 2.2% 650 154
2002/03 21 000 464 353 1421 55 1476 246 1.2% 695 145
2003/04 26 529 1891 1550 3395 1953 5348 1451 5.5% 862 207
2004/05 19 814 1669 548 1586 2103 3689 1715 8.7% 989 190
2005/06 17 503 2543 2169 6355 2731 9086 4223 20.9% 1055 177
2006/07 11 780 2295 853 3601 1374 4975 2171 18.4% 926 182
Sources : Cotton SA, Small-scale Farmer Development




The general South African cotton story is thus not the “success story” as it is reported, 
especially in other developing countries (Gabre-Madhin and Haggblade, 2003). The main 
reasons why cotton production have decreased in SA are the low cotton world price and 
relatively better price of competing crops like maize, sunflower seed and sugar cane. The world cotton price is deflated due to subsidy driven production in counties (like the US, the 
European Union and China as it was claimed by four African countries before the WTO 
Ministerial Meeting in Cancùn) and in combination with an (generally perceived) over valued 
local currency, the profitability of cotton production in SA is marginal.  This despite the fact 
that there has been a noticeable increase in the national average yield  with cotton lint yield 
increasing from less than 400 kg/ha to over 500 kg/ha which can be jointly attributed to more 
smallholder irrigation cotton and the use of Bt technology.  
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Shift to non-regulated private monopoly after cotton sector reform 
From a regulated sector to a liberalised one 
Cotton production has a long history in South Africa but cotton policy was first formalised  in 
1974 with the establishment of the Cotton Board (Macrae, 1995). In addition to keeping 
statistics and grading and classification of seed cotton and lint, the Cotton Board established 
the seed cotton quotas to be ginned by ginneries as well as the lint quotas to be allocated to 
textile industries. The Cotton Board also administered the purchasing price of seed cotton in 
the framework of the "Cotton Marketing Committee". After the marketing board was 
dissolved role players in the cotton industry pushed for the establishment of a non-profit 
organisation to take over some of the essential, but not price fixing, functions of the Board. 
Cotton SA was established to amongst others render information services, to stimulate 
production and cotton use, enhance marketability through research, training and quality 
standards, and serve as an advisory body and industry forum. 
Coordination between private operators - monopoly / monopsony 
In the later 1980s, two companies were operating in the Makhathini Flats, supplying inputs on 
credit to farmers and buying back their cotton production. The credit advance was deducted 
when seed cotton was delivered to the gins.  The two companies shared a weighing bridge and 




(Witt, et al., 2006). This new company became the input supplier in the area and also supplied 
credit in association with the Land Bank. The endeavour was relatively successful for a 
couple of seasons with a loan recovery rate of close to 90% (Gouse, et al., 2005), primarily 
due to the fact that VUNISA was the only credit supplier and buyer and with this 
monopsonistic power were able to, in the absence of land rights, use the cotton crop as 
collateral for the production loan similar to how it is done in a number of south and eastern 
African countries. However, cotton production did not exactly flourish, possibly due to the 
monopolistic / monopsonistic system but more likely due to the harsh and variable climatic 
conditions, limited extension services, variable and marginal profitability of cotton production 
and limited training and support to new farmers.  
From one private monopoly to another 
The institutional structure however collapsed in the 2001/02 harvesting season when a new 
company, Makhathini Cotton Gin (Pty) Ltd, more commonly known as Makhathini Cotton 
Company (MCC), erected a new gin right next to the marketing depot of VUNISA. VUNISA 
distributed inputs and weighed and bought seed cotton at this deport, but their cotton gin was 
situated approximately 100km from the Flats in Pongola. At harvest time 2002 a large number 
of farmers sold their seed cotton to MCC despite the fact that they took credit from VUNISA 
and contractually agreed to deliver their seed cotton to VUNISA. VUNISA and the Land 
Bank suffered a serious financial loss and reacted by limiting credit for the next season to 
farmers they deemed faithful and a low risk. This was the main reason for the drastic 
reduction in the number of cotton growers for the 2002/03 season. MCC did not supply any 
production credit and by offering higher prices than VUNISA, forced VUNISA to stop 
operating on the Makhathini Flats in 2003/04, leaving the whole market to MCC. 
Due to the political history of South Africa and due to credit (read grants) supplied in the past 
by, amongst others, the SA government through developing programmes in the former 
homeland areas, and inability of financial institutions to enforce repayment of loans, adverse 
selection by smallholders are not uncommon. Borrowing money from one gin and supplying 
to another is also not a rare occurrence in Africa where land ownership (default liability) is 
limited and the only collateral for a production loan is the potential harvest.  
An exclusive shift to intensification 
The more recent institutional evolution took place during our study season (2002/03) and are 
currently (2007) still in operation. While setting up its ginnery as mentioned above , MCC 
was also able to negotiate access to the land of an existing irrigation scheme (Mjindi 
Irrigation Scheme) enabling it to engage in direct cotton production.  In addition, MCC also 
negotiated, and continuously negotiate,  joint ventures with farmers who have land with 
access to irrigation water  in order to produce irrigated cotton. Irrigation equipment is 
installed and depending on the arrangement with the farmer paid of over a number of seasons.  
Farmers who take part in this initiative have a choice of being involved in the farming 
activities or not; if not, the land is rented from them for the season or a longer period. Buy-in 
by the farmer and profit sharing is preferred as theft of especially fencing material and 
irrigation equipment is a major problem.  The MCC also has an agreement with the Land 
Bank of repaying outstanding farmer loans.  
By producing their own cotton under irrigation MCC should be able to supply a relatively 
stable flow of seed cotton to be ginned in their gin and are they not 100% dependant on 
variable smallholder dryland production. Due to the mild winter conditions in the Makhathini 
area it is also possible to produce irrigation maize directly after cotton has been harvested - in 
some seasons in fact it is not possible to produce maize in the summer as it is too hot for 
pollination to take place (partially explaining the focus on cotton in the area) . The objectives 
of the increased irrigation approach are to decrease production risk (associated with the 6 
 
climate), increase productivity and better utilise the potential of the area. With additional 
maize production the MCC is able to sustain the cotton gin with a supplementary income.  
However only a limited number of farmers can be part of this initiative as not everyone has 
access to irrigation water and land; and with current world cotton prices, expressed in Rand 
terms, even irrigation cotton production’s profitability is questionable. It is thus possible that 
farmers will not be able to repay the cost of mainly irrigation equipment that they share with 
MCC.   Only a few farmers are able to finance cotton inputs out of their own pockets and 
from other income sources and most farmers remain dependant on some kind of assistance. It 
can also be argued that these farmers who are able and willing to finance their own inputs are 
the real cotton farmers. In 2005/06 for instance the KwaZulu Natal Agricultural Department 
supplied input hampers to farmers on the Flats, which explains the jump in farmer numbers 
from 548 in 2004/05 to 2169 in 2005/06. In 2006/07 when no freebies were available farmer 
numbers again fell to 853.   
LESSONS FROM THE STUDIES ON THE PROFITABILITY OF BT-COTTON IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
The impact assessment studies 
Bt cotton was first released for commercial production for the 1997/98 production season. 
Impact assessment studies targeted at appraising Bt cotton's profitability and suitability for 
South African production conditions focussed on mainly smallholders as South Africa was 
one of few countries (and the only one in Africa) where smallholders adopted the new 
technology. 
Findings  of these studies showed that South African smallholders benefited from the 
introduction of Bt cotton (Beyers, et al., 2002; Gouse, et al., 2002a; Gouse, et al., 2002b; 
Gouse, et al., 2004; Ismaël, et al., 2002a; Ismaël, et al., 2002b; Morse, et al., 2004; Thirtle and 
Jenkins Beyers, 2003), but recently two studies have to explain the technological triumph in 
context of the institutional arrangement and the institutional shortfalls (Gouse, et al., 2005). 
Since the 2001/02 production season, the Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche 
Agronomique pour le Développement (CIRAD), jointly with the University of Pretoria, has 
undergone a more technical assessment of Bt cotton use. The research has consisted of 
evaluating the expression and effectiveness of Bt gene, of addressing the gene flow 
phenomenon and of the eventual evolution of the pest complex on cotton plants (Hofs, et al., 
2006a; Hofs, et al., 2006b; Hofs, et al., 2006c). In addition, a survey was conducted in the 
2002/03 season to understand the cotton production practises of smallholders. The results of 
this survey and study are reported in the next Section. 
Profitability gain at low level of yield 
In Table 2 and 3 the economic impacts of using Bt cotton by South African smallholders are 
considered in comparison with cotton producers in other countries, namely China (Pray, et al., 
2002; Xu, et al., 2004), India (Bennett, et al., 2004; Orphal, 2005),  Argentina (Qaim and de 
Janvry, 2003), Mexico (FAO, 2004; Magaña, et al., 1999; Traxler and Godoy-Avila, 2004), 
and the USA (Falck-Zepeda, et al., 1999; Fitt, 2003; Kerby, 2001). Only studies reporting 
similar impact indicators were used and a number of studies reporting aggregated information 
could not be included.  The table contains countries where Bt cotton was  extensively adopted 
but under very different production practises and not necessarily by smallholders. 
Yield gain from a low initial yield 
According to previous studies, the relative yield gain (expressed in percentage) that resulted 
from the use of Bt cotton in South Africa was higher than that found in other countries (Table  and 3). One of the main reasons for this is that the basis yield (non-Bt cotton yield) is very 
low and a small real change in yield is exaggerated when expressed relative to a low non-Bt 
or conventional cotton yield. In fact, in some countries and seasons, the yield advantage of Bt 
cotton was more than the total seed cotton yield attained per hectare in South Africa. The use 
of Bt-cotton in Australia, the yield world champion, has not induced any yield gain. This 
might be due to limited Lepidoptera pressure or Australian farmers’ effective insect control 
practises. It's also the case for one Chinese Province along the Valley of the Yangtze River 
where pest pressure used to be less important (Xu, et al., 2004), as opposed to what is 
reported for the Valley of the Yellow River (Pray, et al., 2002).  
Table 2. Summary of the South African smallholder profitability assessment studies  
Bt-Cotton non Bt-Cotton Bt-Cotton non Bt-Cotton Yield Input cost Cash expenses Net margin
1998/99 738 452 167 81 63% 20% 19% 106%
1999/00 489 264 57 -2 85% 25% 17%




1999/00 576 395 184 128 46% 51% 43%
1998/99 475 457 126 128 4% 16% -1%
1999/00 425 304 103 66 40% 16% 56%
Note: Cash expenses cover remunerated labour cost for harvest and insecticide spraying




Thirtle et al, 
2003
Source Campaign Seedcotton yield, kg/ha
 
 
Table 3. Impacts of Bt cotton use in other countries 
Bt-Cotton non Bt-Cotton Bt-Cotton non Bt-Cotton Yield Input cost Cash expenses Net margin
1999/2000 3371 3186 967 749 6% -23% 29%
2000/01 2941 1901 1208 658 55% 4% 84%
2001/02 3481 3138 833 621 11% -17% 34%
Xu et al, 2004 * 2002/03 3615 3829 1824 1963 -6% 43% -7%
2002/03 2180 1500 808 542 45% 15% 49%
2003/04 2250 1380 1106 636 63% 2% 74%
2002/03 non-
irrigated
1253 1093 270 339 15% 107% 26% -20%
2002/03 
irrigated
1683 1556 475 359 8% 35% 8% 32%
Magaña et al, 
1999 **
1998/99 2068 1704 1102 630 21% -5% 75%
1997/98 2197 2197 0%
1998/99 4957 4142 20%
1999/00 2062 1558 174 135 32% 29%
2000/01 2182 1625 19 12 34% 58%
1996/97 4613 4929 -6% 9%
1997/98 5026 5002 0% 8%
1998/99 4076 4410 -8% -12%
1999/00 4805 4763 1% -13%
2000/01 4529 4381 3% -30%
2001/02 5497 5234 5% -35%
Falck-Zepeda et 
al, 1999 **
1998/99 1270 à 2540 3 à 11 % - 6 à -18 %
Kerby, 2001 1996 à 2000 2748 2550 8%
* Net margin with only deduction of seed and insecticides costs




Country Variation due to Bt-Cotton (% of non Bt-Cotton) Net margin, $/ha
Benett et al. 
2004 *
Pray et al, 2002
Source Campaign Seedcotton yield, kg/ha
Traxler et al. 




Qaim & de 
Janvry, 2003




The same observation applies for the relative gain of profitability. The relative gain in South 
Africa is amongst the highest because the yield gain (even though small in comparison with 
other countries’) has more than compensated the increase of the cost to control cotton pests 
(seeds + insecticides). With South African smallholders, the use of Bt-cotton has indeed 
resulted in an increase of pest control cost (Gouse, et al., 2002a), contrary to what is 
7 
 commonly claimed in other countries. Part of the reason for this is that it has been shown that 
smallholders in SA spray only about half of the optimal level of insecticides (Shankar and 
Thirtle, 2005), due to limited availability of insecticides as linked to credit, limited knapsack 
sprayers, limited labour, limited clean spraying water and limited knowledge and managerial 
skills. But the cost increase effect is not limited to South Africa; in several countries, the cost 
increase with the seed cost and the additional technology fee has actually been higher than the 
saving from reduced insecticide usage. The contrary is true along the Valley of the Yellow 
River in China where the reduction in number of sprays has been substantial, with Chinese 
farmers in the past spraying up to 20 to 30 times a season. This also applies to Australia 
where the Bt technology fee
1 was reduced by Monsanto.  
Change in production cost structure and associated financial risk 
Cotton production by smallholders in South Africa is not intensive. Cash expenses essentially 
correspond to acquisition of seeds and insecticides. Seeds have been supplied to smallholders 
at market price for a long time. The cost of seeds of conventional cotton was around US$ 
26/ha and it has represented 40-60% of the total input cost. The adoption of Bt-cotton has led 
to seed’s share to increase to 70-80%, as a combined effect of a higher seed price but mainly 
the additional technology fee (Table 4). The change of this ratio is also valid in other 
countries. Again China is different. Although the adoption of Bt cotton has led to an increase 
in the seed price
2, the ratio remains lower because of the high level of intensification while 
the number of insecticide sprays  remain high after adoption due to high pest pressure, at least 
along the Yellow River Valley (Table 5).  
Table 4. Change in the production cost structure of SA smallholders  
 
% input cost % cash expenses % input cost % cash expenses
1998/99 79% 49% 47% 29%
1999/00 80% 60% 46% 32%









Note: Cash expenses may include the remunerated labour to spray insecticdes and to harvest while some 




Seed cost of Bt-Cotton Seed cost of non Bt-Cotton




The increase of the relative share of the seeds in the total input cost is globally important 
especially for developing countries and more specifically Africa. From the perspective of 
financially resource-poor farmers, this increase implies greater financial risk because the 
expense is incurred early in the season and cannot be adjusted to the evolution of the cropping 
season (Fok and Raymond, 1995). Reducing or fragmenting the use of inputs is commonly 
how farmers try to respond to adverse climatic conditions. This is indeed what was observed 
in South Africa where smallholders split one bag of seeds normally destined for one hectare 
                                                      
 
1 Monsanto has accepted to decrease the technology fee from Australian $ 245 to 170/ha, between 1996/97 and 2001/02, 
for fear of seeing farmers moving away from its varieties for economic reasons. With the last technology fee level, farmers 
have to strictly comply with recommended techniques of Bt-cotton. 




                                                     
to sow on two hectares
3. A study on transgenic white maize in South Africa also found that 
smallholders who bought top-dressing fertiliser chose not to apply it after limited early season 
rainfall (Gouse, et al., 2006). The change of the production cost structure, as well as its 
implication on higher financial risk for the smallholders, has seldom been emphasized in Bt 
cotton impact assessment studies. A post-season technology fee payment arrangement might 
be more suited for especially Africa where the vast majority of cotton is produced on dryland 
and insect pressure is as variable as the climatic conditions. 
 
 
3 Monsanto lately has taken this behaviour into account. Vis-à-vis smallholders, instead of distributing seeds in bags of 25 
kg, seeds are now packaged in bags of 5 kg but the unit price has increased 30% as compared to the former packaging 
which is still in use for commercial farmers. Table 5. Change in the production cost structure in other countries 
% input cost % cash expenses % input cost % cash expenses
1999/2000 23% 16% 15% 12%
2000/01 21% 16% 7% 6%
2001/02 22% 18% 4% 3%
2002/03 non-
irrigué 74% 34% 38% 11%
2002/03 
irrigué 79% 31% 26% 8%




1999/00 60% 29% 15% 5%
2000/01 55% 26% 16% 6%
Seed cost of Bt-Cotton Seed cost of non Bt-Cotton Sources Campaign Countries
Pray et al., 
2002
Orphal, 2005 India
Note: Cash expenses may include the remunerated labour to spray insecticdes and to harvest while 
some authors may include labour into the input costs





Perception of advantages and of positive evolutions linked to using Bt-cotton 
A survey was conducted to capture the opinions of cotton farmers in South Africa (Gouse, et 
al., 2002b). The results show the difference between the advantages of Bt cotton as perceived 
by Bt adopters and non-adopters. (Table 6). The cost saving with regard to insecticides is to 
be understood broadly, it encompasses in particular the reduction of the transaction costs to 
acquire insecticides and which could be important for smallholders
4. This advantage appears 
to become most important after the farmers adopt Bt cotton because in rural areas where 
infrastructure, transport and services are almost non-existent, managing pest infestation in 
crops is a major problem
5. 
Table 6. Distribution of the smallholders according to the perceived advantages associated with Bt 
cotton 
non Bt-Cotton Bt-Cotton
Yield increase 62% 58%
Improved quality of cotton 12% 30%
Higher price of cotton 12% 15%
Savings on insecticides 77% 70%
Labout saving 42% 35%
Less insecticide sprays 30% 18%
other 27% 40%
Source : Gouse et al., 2002
Percentage of farmers' answers according to the cotton used Avantages perceived
 
At the level of commercial farmers, convenience or peace of mind is often emphasised
6. 
Some commercial farmers have reported some positive evolution of the pest complex: the 
reduced use of pyrethroid insecticides might have favoured a greater presence of beneficials 
(like lady birds). This opinion nevertheless must be balanced by more frequent sucking pests, 
like jassids or aphids (Hofs, et al., 2006b) on which the predators feed. 
                                                      
 
4 Long distance travel to buy insecticides, at a time when there are so much to do in the fields correspond to costs that the 
use of Bt-Cotton contributes to alleviate 
5 Pesticide application implies huge difficulties for small-scale cotton farmers. With a low level of education amongst 
small-scale farmers, problems with the mixing of pesticides and calibration of knapsack sprayers for different pesticides 
cause concern about the real efficacy and effectiveness of pesticide application. Applying pesticides is a labour intensive 
action for small-scale farmers. Walking with a knapsack sprayer on his back a farmer has to cover a distance of between 10 
and 20 kilometres per hectare. Water has to be fetched from communal water points and water (especially in the Tonga 
community) is a scarce commodity and has to be fetched with water trucks or any other transport available. By the time a 
farmer has noticed bollworms, bought his pesticides and started to spray, severe damage has already been done. 
6 The greatest advantage often mentioned pertains to peace of mind in conducting pest control during the Christmas and 
New Year’s period which falls in a crucial insect control stage. Less time has to be spent on scouting  before spraying 
insecticides and climatic conditions play a lesser role in the effectiveness of insecticide applications. 
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 FRAGILE AGRICULTURE AND BAD PROFITABILITY OF BT-COTTON IN AN 
UNFAVOURABLE YEAR 
The results of the survey we conducted are presented so as to set the smallholders' cotton 
production in the context of the Makhathini Flats. The survey was implemented in eight 
villages of the Ubombo and Ngwavuma districts during the 2002/03 production season. The 
survey device was initially set up to capture the farming features of a sample of 193 farms and 
to get the opinions on cotton growing through a sub-sample of 86 farmers. However in this 
particular season there were only 353 cotton producers in total, and within the sub-sample to 
follow-up the cotton practices, only 56 farms eventually grew   cotton. The sample size as 
share of the population appears to be substantial and not too small. However, in our 
experience the variability in data collected from smallholders producing under dryland 
conditions is usually considerable, resulting in findings like average yield differences to be 
statistically insignificant (under the 5% fresh hold) even though it might be substantial. The 
survey questionnaires were translated into Zulu and farmers were interviewed in three phases, 
at the farmers' houses or in their fields.  
Agriculture: a marginal activity close to disappearing? 
Families are relatively large, around 12 per household, and about 50% of the household is 
made up of adults older than 56 and children younger than 16.  (Table 7). Very few people 
took part in farming activities and there is a need for additional labour to be remunerated by 
cash. Cash is however the limiting factor. 
Table 7. Household demographics and constraints 
 
woman man
Number of farms 78 115 193
% of farm heads never been schooled 82.7% 83.6% 83.5%
Number of people in household * 13,4 (5,5) 11,8 (4,9) 12.6
Number of people over 56 year old 2.2 2 2.1
Number of people less than 16 year old 4.9 4.6 4.9
% of farmers feeling the need of 
complementary labour 100% 100% 100%
Total available land by farm  * (ha) 7,4 (7,8) 6,2 (3,8) 6.7
Cultivated land by farm (ha) 2,4 (2,1) 1,8 (2,1) 2.1
Usage ratio of available land 35% 28% 31%





Households have an average of 7 hectares available for farming but only one third was 
actually cultivated in the 2002/03 season.  It has been reported that this under-use of available 
land was not specific to that production season only. This emphasises the shortage of willing 
labour and the decline of agriculture in the Makhathini Flats. It also emphasises that in many 
cases, land is not the limiting factor in African countries. 
Female cotton farmers are not uncommon and like their male counterparts more than 80% of 
these female farmers have not had any formal schooling. Very few of the remaining 20% have 
attended secondary school.  
Particular cotton specialization 
Of the 86 farmers we monitored and who had intended to grow cotton, only 56 actually did; 
planting an average area of 2.3 ha of cotton per household. On the Flats there is a cotton 
specialisation which is not at all typical in family farming in Africa. During the 2002/03 
season, we did not see any other crops being grown in the surveyed area, indicating that those 
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 farmers who chose to not produce cotton, grew nothing else. The harsh climatic conditions, 
lack of irrigation and the lack of a functioning market are commonly considered the reasons 
why alternative cash crops like sugar cane and maize are not encountered (Witt, et al., 2006) 
amongst the traditionally cotton farmers. The under-utilisation of arable land and the lack of 
incentive of farmers to even try and grow part of their household food crop needs are 
definitely not the norm in the rest of Africa. In a continued study on transgenic white maize 
the University of Pretoria also found that fewer farmers are planting smaller maize areas. One 
of the explanations is that the last four seasons in the study area have been exceptionally dry 
but an additional explanation is that the previously disadvantaged now, compared to pre-
democratic South Africa, receive substantially higher old age pension, disability grants and 
also more recently child grants. It is likely that it has become more convenient and affordable 
to just buy maize meal (the staple). In SA smallholder agriculture is also associated with 
poverty and farming is no longer attractive to the youth in the rural areas. The reduction, if 
not disappearance of the supply of much needed technical assistance, contributes to make 
agriculture further less attractive. 
Cotton is cultivated for the cash income it could generate. Farmers site income security is one 
of the biggest reasons why cotton is grown, short after the advantage of benefiting from 
technical assistance (Table 8), although this assistance appears to be rather loose as compared 
to Francophone African countries. Farmers’ perception that cotton is adapted to the local 
conditions underscores their lack of production options in the harsh conditions. 
Table 8. Distribution of the farmers' reasons in favour of growing cotton 
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Secured cash income 37 7 62
Quick payment 7 12 26
Profitability 3 9 20
Input credit supply 3 6 34
Technical assistance obtained 6 41 74
Crop adapted to local conditions 29 11 58
Other 2
Total 85 86 276
Reasons for growing cotton Total number of answers
Number of answers at rank
 
 
Just like in most other African countries, cotton cropping is felt to be demanding in terms of 
labour and cash expenses for production inputs. These are constraints that a steady financial 
source can help overcome, like pension allocated to elderly people
7. We found that the   
farmers who grown cotton in 2002/03, when there was not credit available, had more financial 
resource through pension (on average, cotton planters had 0.67 pension compared to 0.17 of 
non-planters).  
Limited extent of intensification furthermore reduced in unfavourable year 
The 2002/03 season was characterised by late rain and drought at the time of fructification. 
The uncertainty about possible credit to fund inputs, which lasted beyond the normal dates for 
sowing, even further delayed sowing. The situation was also exacerbated by the limited 
availability of ploughing services when the rain eventually came. All the farmers in our 
sample hired a contractor for mechanised land preparation at  Rand 370 (US $ 49.3) per 
hectare. 
Inputs are limited to seeds and chemical insecticides and for Bt cotton ads up to an average of 
                                                      
 
7 In South Africa, a monthly pension of Rand 650 (or 97 US$ in 2005) was allocated to women and men respectively from 
60 and 65 year old. 
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 US $ 75/ha, which calculates to approximately 22% more than the US $ 61.3/ha of 
conventional cotton. In calculating this cost, we have taken into account the fact that farmers 
split one 25 kilogram bag of seeds to sow two hectares
8; this is a practice which would have 
contributed to lower yields
9 in the 2002/03 season.  
The total cost to control cotton pests was lower than what has been reported in previous 
studies because of the lower pest pressure (inversely correlated with a drier season) which 
resulted in fewer chemical sprays. On average, farmers that produced conventional cotton 
sprayed 2.5 times, while Bt farmers sprayed 1.9 times. Even though there is a statistically 
significant difference it is hardly substantial (Table 9). Consequently, the total cost to control 
cotton pests was significantly higher with Bt-cotton. The cost of Bt seed corresponded to 65% 
of the total input cost compared to 42% of conventional cotton, of the same order than what 
was observed in previous studies. Not surprisingly the cost of land preparation for 
conventional cotton was the same as for Bt cotton.  
The low pest pressure could have permitted Bt-cotton growers not to use pyrethroid-based 
insecticides (broad based but specific to control boll worms) at all. It was not the case 
although Bt cotton growers used significantly less than conventional cotton growers. Sucking 
pests cannot be controlled by the Bt gene and farmers still had to apply organophosphate-
based insecticides. Bt farmers applied more organophosphates
10, but the 25% difference was 
not statistically significant due to variability in the data. 
Table 9. Production cost and profitability in 2002/03 
Bt non-Bt value  %
Average number of insecticide sprays 1,9 (0,6) 2,5 (0,8) -0,6 * -24%
% of farmers using cypermethrin 60.0% 84.60% -24.60%
Dosage of cypermethrin g/ha (vs boll worms) 12,4 (12,2) 24,2 (15,0) -11,8 * -49%
Dosage of Monostem g/ha (vs sucking pests) 110,0 (61,0) 88,0 (52,0) 22 25%
cost of insecticides ($/ha) 25,9 (12,4) 35,6 (14,5) -9,7 * -27%
cost of seeds ($/ha) 49.0 25.7 23,3 * 91%
Total cost of inputs ($/ha) 75,0 (12,4) 61,3 (14,5) 13,7 * 22%
cost of inputs + ploughing ($/ha) 124,4 (124,4) 110,6 (110,6) 13,8 * 12%
cost ratio seeds/inputs 65.3% 41.9% 23.4%
cost ratio seeds/cash expenses ** 39.4% 23.2% 16.2%
seedcotton yield (kg/ha) 522 (241) 423 (259) 99 23%
% of farms with yiled <400 kg/ha 30.00% 57.70% -27.70%
Income Net of cash expenses ($/ha) 84 (97) 58 (107) 26 45%
% of farms with negative net income 6.70% 15.40% -8.70%
% of farms with positive net income <160 $/ha 63.30% 57.70% 5.60%
% of farms with output/input ratio < 2 73.40% 69.60% 3.80%
* Test of Student significant at 5% ** cash expenses without remunerated labour
Cotton type Difference (Bt - conventionnal)
 
 
Marginal profitability of cotton production 
Under the unfavourable climatic conditions of the 2002/03 season , the average yield of   
conventional cotton was close to the longer term average of about 400 kg/ha of seed cotton 
but with great variability as can be seen from the standard deviation in brackets in Table 9. 
Nearly 60% of the conventional cotton farmers did not reach this yield level as compared to 
only 30% in the case of Bt cotton growers. The average yield for Bt-cotton was among the 
lowest reported in the previous research works; about 500 kg/ha. Because of the great 
fluctuation around the average yield and of the limited size of the survey sample, the 22% 
yield superiority of Bt cotton is not found statistically significant (Table 9). 
                                                      
 
8 In 2002/03, a bag of 25 kg of seeds was sold at Rand 387. An additional technology fee of Rand 350 was added to the 
seed price. The total cost hence is US$ 98 per 25 kg bag of Bt seed  or US $ 3.9/kg. 
9 The late sowing and drought have limited the growth of cotton plants. More plants should have given higher yield.  




                                                     
With regard to income after deduction of cash expenses and before remuneration of family 
labour, Bt cotton rendered US $ 84/ha on average, which is equivalent to a monthly pension 
for an elderly person. This figure is substantially higher but not statistically superior to the 
income from conventional cotton (US $ 58/ha). It is noteworthy that, even for the previous 
years which did not suffer from the same climatic and institutional shortfalls, the cotton 
income is low with reference to the monthly old age pension (Table 2). Clearly, the ability of 
small scale cotton production to reduce poverty appears to be limited on the Makhathini Flats, 
contrary to what used to be claimed (Ismaël, et al., 2002b; Thirtle and Jenkins Beyers, 2003). 
Analysis of the distribution of the income values provides some clarification about the 
profitability variation and the risk feature of cotton growing conditions of the 2002/03 season.  
About 15% of the conventional cotton growers did not even have enough income to cover 
cash expenses. Despite higher seed costs, only 7% of Bt farmers were not able to cover cash 
expenses. About two thirds of the farmers achieved positive income, after payment of cash 
expenses, but less than US $ 160/ha. Almost 70% of the farmers have grown cotton with an 
output/input ratio smaller than 2;generally regarded as the minimum ratio to motivate 
resource-poor farmers in investing in inputs, the payoff on investment is just too small. 
One would think that these kind of results would deter farmers from growing cotton.   
However this is not the case and in our survey  farmers indicated their intention to keep on 
growing cotton and using Bt cotton although they complain about the high seed cost. This 
intention has materialized as about 1500 farmers grew cotton in the 2003/04 season, 95% of 
them using Bt cotton. Farmers obviously recognise the fact that the 2002/03 season was a 
particularly bad year and ague that there might be money to make out of cotton in the future.  
Unfortunately, the option of favouring irrigated production (seer supra) is depriving a great 
number of farmers of the possibility to continue cotton production with credit and technical 
assistance as MCC do not supply these. Some observers also claim that the adoption rateof Bt 
cotton is high because the use of conventional cotton is being discouraged: although farmers 
might have access to conventional cotton seed, they have better insurance of selling their 
production if they buy Bt cotton because of the arrangements
11 between the seed supplier and 
MCC (Witt, et al., 2006). This observation is however open to discussion as MCC is loosing 
money for not having enough cotton to gin and it should be happy to gin any cotton.  
CONCLUSION 
The bulk of the South African cotton crop is produced by large scale commercial farmers. 
There for it might be misleading to present South Africa’s impressive GM cotton adoption 
figures as evidence of successful GMC use by smallholder farmers. The Makhathini Flats Bt 
cotton story has been hailed as the first proof that genetically modified crops can benefit 
smallholders in Africa. There can be no doubt about the fact that the technology works and 
that farmers did benefit in seasons with high bollworm pressure. The institutional 
arrangements however need to be stressed for decision makers in other developing countries 
in order to see the SA smallholder Bt cotton experience in context. The SA experience 
emphasise the fact that resource poor farmers are more than willing to adopt new technologies 
if it is accompanied by credit and technical support, but the adoption of the technology alone 
do not ensure sustainable production or progress. Like in all agricultural sectors, the 
willingness to invest in agriculture, a production system and inputs is determined by the up 
and down stream institutional arrangements and structures. The way input and output markets 
are arranged and the way farmers are able to interact with and have access to these markets 
 
 
11 It has been reported thatMCC only buys seed cotton in bags it has provided, and these bags are only distributed to 
farmers who have bought Bt cotton. Of cause the Flats have had a history of “polyprop” contamination and this might be 
the reason for distributing bags. 15 
 
are crucial to the success of any agricultural endeavour. Technical solutions can not be 
expected to solve problems of an institutional order and in the case of the Makhathini Flats 
cotton producers, focus on a technical solution has diverted attention from the institutional 
problems.   
 
South Africa commercial and smallholder cotton farmers cannot compete with subsidised 
cotton producers, like in the USA, and one can expect the cotton area in SA to keep declining 
as long as the world cotton price remains low compared to competing crops like maize, soy 
beans and sunflower seed. Recent institutional collapse and huge credit default in the 
Zimbabwean cotton sector is another example of an African country where the profitability of 
cotton production has become just too marginal. Large scale commercial farmers can usually 
adapt their production systems or plant other crops but smallholders’ resources are limited 
and they are hardest hit by a struggling cotton sector. 
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